Management turnover in subsidiaries of conglomerates versus stand-alone firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McNeil, C; Niehaus, G; Powers, E
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00190-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 63-96
• 关键词: Management turnover; internal labor market; Conglomerates

摘要

We compare turnover of subsidiary managers inside conglomerate firms to turnover of CEO's of comparable stand-alone firms. We find that, compared to turnover of CEOs, subsidiary manager turnover is significantly more sensitive to changes in performance and significantly more likely following poor performance. For subsidiary managers, the relation between turnover and performance is significantly stronger when the subsidiary operates in an industry that is related to the parent's primary industry. Results suggest that boards of directors are relatively ineffective disciplinarians of CEOs and despite their other apparent failings, conglomerate firms have relatively strict disciplining mechanisms for subsidiary managers. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.