The choice of equity-selling mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Wu, YL
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.08.003
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 93-119
• 关键词: private placement; public offering

摘要

This paper examines the impact of information asymmetry and monitoring of managers on the choice between public offerings and private placements. Three key findings emerge. First, private placement firms have higher information asymmetry than public offering firms. Second, private placement investors do not engage in more monitoring than public offering investors. Finally, discounts for private placements sold to managers are higher than discounts for private placements in which managers do not participate. The final two findings cast doubts on the widely held view that private placements are motivated by a demand for enhanced monitoring. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.