Information and bank credit allocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dell'Ariccia, G; Marquez, R
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00210-1
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 185-214
• 关键词: Bank competition; credit allocation; cross-border liberalization

摘要

Private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders. We analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders. First, we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments with greater information asymmetries. Second, when faced with greater competition from outside lenders, banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers (flight to captivity). Third, if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated, an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can worsen the informed lender's overall loan portfolio. The model explains observed consequences of financial liberalizations. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.