Industry structure and horizontal takeovers: Analysis of wealth effects on rivals, suppliers, and corporate customers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shahrur, H
• 署名单位: Bentley University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 61-98
• 关键词: Takeovers; mergers; EFFICIENCY; collusion; Buyer power

摘要

We examine the wealth effects of horizontal takeovers on rivals of the merging firms, and on firms in the takeover industry's supplier and customer industries. Inconsistent with the collusion and buyer power motives, we find significant positive abnormal returns to rivals, suppliers, and corporate customers for the subsample of takeovers with positive combined wealth effect to target and bidder shareholders. Overall, our findings suggest that the average takeover in our sample is driven by efficiency considerations. However, we find evidence suggesting that horizontal takeovers increase the buyer power of the merging firms if suppliers are concentrated. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.