Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berger, AN; Miller, NH; Petersen, MA; Rajan, RG; Stein, JC
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Federal Reserve System - USA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 237-269
• 关键词: organizations; Soft information; banking

摘要

Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations have a comparative advantage in activities that make extensive use of soft information. We provide evidence consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks. In particular, large banks are less willing to lend to informationally difficult credits, such as firms with no financial records. Moreover, after controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, we find that large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.