Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moeller, T
• 署名单位: Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.11.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 167-190
• 关键词: mergers; acquisitions; AGENCY; governance

摘要

Mergers and acquisitions are Well-suited events for a detailed study of the valuation effects of corporate governance structures. Using a sample of 388 takeovers announced in the friendly environment of the 1990s, I empirically show that target shareholder control, proxied by low target chief executive officer share ownership, low fractions of inside directors, and the presence of large Outside blockholders, is positively correlated with takeover premiums. In contrast, studies of takeovers in the hostile environment of the 1980s have shown a negative relation between target shareholder control and takeover premiums. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.