Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sherman, AE
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 615-649
• 关键词: initial public offerings; ipos; auctions; book building; regulation; entry; Uniform price; Discriminatory

摘要

The U.S. book-building method has become increasingly popular for initial public offerings (IPOs) worldwide over the last decade, whereas sealed-bid IPO auctions have been abandoned in nearly all of the many countries in which they have been tried. I model book building, discriminatory auctions, and uniform price auctions in an environment in which the number of investors and the accuracy of investors' information are endogenous. Book building lets underwriters manage investor access to shares, allowing them to reduce risk for both issuers and investors and to control spending on information acquisition, thereby limiting either underpricing or aftermarket volatility. Because more control and less risk are beneficial to all issuers, the advantages of book building's allocational flexibility could explain why global patterns of issuer choice are surprisingly consistent. My models also predict that offerings with higher expected underpricing have lower expected aftermarket volatility; that an auction open to large numbers of potential bidders is vulnerable to inaccurate pricing and to fluctuations in the number of bidders; and that both book-built and auctioned IPOs will exhibit partial adjustment to both private and public information. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.