Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Boubakri, N; Cosset, JC; Guedhami, O
署名单位：
Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Memorial University Newfoundland
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.003
发表日期：
2005
页码：
369-399
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. Using a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries over the period 1980 to 2001, we find that the government relinquishes control over time to the benefit of local institutions, individuals, and foreign investors, and that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. Firm size, growth, and industry affiliation, privatization method, as well as the level of institutional development and investor protection, explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. The positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.