Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oyer, P; Schaefer, S
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.03.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 99-133
• 关键词: employee compensation; Stock options; incentives; sorting; retention

摘要

Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and employee retention. We gather data from three sources on firms' stock option grants to middle managers. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. We also conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms' option-granting choices. We reject an incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and retention explanations appear consistent with the data. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.