How much value can blockholders tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian mass privatization auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atanasov, V
• 署名单位: Babson College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 191-234
• 关键词: private benefits of control; large shareholders

摘要

This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40-60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (J. law Ecorg 26 (1983) 301) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.