Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Khorana, Ajay; Servaes, Henri; Wedge, Lei
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University System of Florida; University of South Florida
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 179-204
• 关键词: mutual funds; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; fund governance

摘要

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.