Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fan, Joseph P. H.; Wong, T. J.; Zhang, Tianyu
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 330-357
• 关键词: political connections; corporate governance; IPO performance; partial privatization; CHINA

摘要

Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.