Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bolton, Patrick; Freixas, Xavier; Shapiro, Joel
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.06.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 297-330
• 关键词: Conflicts of interest; Information provision; one-stop banks; FINANCIAL ADVICE

摘要

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.