Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Davis, Gerald F.; Kim, E. Han
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.04.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 552-570
• 关键词: Conflicts of interest; Proxy voting; Mutual funds; employee pension plans

摘要

The magnitude of mutual funds' business ties with their portfolio firms is documented and is linked to funds' proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices. Aggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Votes at specific firms, however, reveal that funds are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients. Because the votes took place when funds knew their votes would be publicly scrutinized, fund families with a larger client base may have adopted voting policies that led to less frequent opposition to management at all firms. (C) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.