Theft and taxes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Desai, Mihir A.; Dyck, Alexander; Zingales, Luigi
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of Toronto; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.005
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 591-623
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; corporate taxation

摘要

This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private benefits extracted by company insiders and that the quality of the corporate governance system affects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. Analyses of a tax enforcement crackdown in Russia and cross-country data on tax changes support this two-way interaction between corporate governance and corporate taxation. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.