Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chava, Sudheer; Purnanandam, Amiyatosh
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.06.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 755-786
• 关键词: floating-to-fixed rate debt structure; managerial incentives; corporate governance; monitoring; derivatives

摘要

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.