A lender-based theory of collateral

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M.
• 署名单位: New York University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.06.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 826-859
• 关键词: Collateral; Soft information; loan market competition; Relationship lending

摘要

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis--vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.