Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Chari, Anusha; Gupta, Nandini
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 633-656
• 关键词: foreign direct investment; entry deregulation; Industry concentration; State ownership; privatization

摘要

This paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry. Using data from India's economic reforms, the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry, state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than privately-owned firms, and profitable state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state-owned firms. The pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state-owned firms to optimally enact reforms. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.