Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dahya, Jay; Dimitrov, Orlin; McConnell, John J.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; American University Bulgaria; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 73-100
• 关键词: Board of directors; dominant shareholders; independent directors; corporate governance

摘要

We investigate the relation between corporate Value and the proportion of the board made up of independent directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 Countries. We find a positive relation, especially in Countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. The findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder protection by appointing an 'independent' board. The cost to the dominant shareholder of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder. Thus, not all dominant shareholders choose independent boards. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.