Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Graham, John R.; Li, Si; Qiu, Jiaping
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Wilfrid Laurier University; McMaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 44-61
• 关键词: corporate misreporting; financial restatement; Corporate fraud; bank loans; Cost of debt

摘要

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and More covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All Rights reserved.