Cross-ownership, returns, and voting in mergers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matvos, Gregor; Ostrovsky, Michael
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.11.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 391-403
• 关键词: Mergers and acquisitions; Bidder returns; Proxy voting

摘要

We show that institutional shareholders of acquiring companies on average do not lose money around public merger announcements, because they hold substantial stakes in the targets and make up for the losses from the acquirers with the gains from the targets. Depending on their holdings in the target, acquirer shareholders generally realize different returns from the same merger, some losing money and others gaining. This conflict of interest is reflected in the mutual fund voting behavior: In mergers with negative acquirer announcement returns, cross-owners are significantly more likely to vote for the merger. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.