Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bargeron, Leonce L.; Schlingemann, Frederik P.; Stulz, Rene M.; Zutter, Chad J.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.11.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 375-390
• 关键词: Private equity acquisitions; Target abnormal returns

摘要

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.