Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists just vote no?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Del Guercio, Diane; Seery, Laura; Woidtke, Tracie
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.01.002
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 84-103
• 关键词: SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; ceo turnover; Director reputation; Public pension funds; Director elections

摘要

We examine just vote no campaigns, a recent innovation in low-cost shareholder activist tools whereby activists encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward a director's election to express dissatisfaction with management performance or the firm's corporate governance structure. Grundfest [1993. Just vote no: a minimalist strategy for dealing with barbarians inside the gates. Stanford Law Review 45, 857-937] argues that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to take immediate action to avoid further embarrassment. We find a variety of supportive evidence, including operating performance improvements and abnormal disciplinary chief executive officer (CEO) turnover, indicating that such campaigns induce boards to take actions in shareholders' interests. Furthermore, abnormal turnover is robust to controlling for concurrent events and firm- and CEO-specific controls. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.