Voluntary disclosures around share repurchases

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Brockman, Paul; Khurana, Inder K.; Martin, Xiumin
• 署名单位: University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 175-191
• 关键词: voluntary disclosures; management forecasts; SHARE REPURCHASES

摘要

Managers increase the frequency and magnitude of bad news announcements during the 1-month period prior to repurchasing shares. To a lesser extent, they also increase the frequency and magnitude of good news announcements during the 1-month period following their repurchases. These results are consistent with Barclay and Smith's [1988. Corporate payout policy: Cash dividends versus open-market repurchases. journal of Financial Economics 22, 64-82.] conjecture that share repurchases, unlike dividends, create incentives for managers to manipulate information flows. We further show that managers provide downward-biased earnings forecasts before repurchases and that managers' propensity to alter information flows prior to share repurchases increases with their ownership interest in the firm. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.