Investor activism and takeovers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Greenwood, Robin; Schor, Michael
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Morgan Stanley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.005
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 362-375
• 关键词: Investor activism; event studies; Hedge funds; corporate control

摘要

Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent. Firms targeted by activists are more likely than control firms to get acquired. Finally, activist investors' portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover interest declined. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.