CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Jeong-Bon; Li, Yinghua; Zhang, Liandong
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.013
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 713-730
• 关键词: Equity incentives; Crash risk; COMPENSATION; corporate governance; CFO

摘要

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.