Board structure and price informativeness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferreira, Daniel; Ferreira, Miguel A.; Raposo, Clara C.
• 署名单位: Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Universidade de Lisboa; European Corporate Governance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.007
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 523-545
• 关键词: CORPORATE BOARDS; independent directors; Price informativeness; monitoring; takeovers

摘要

We develop and test the hypothesis that stock price informativeness affects the structure of corporate boards. We find a negative relation between price informativeness and board independence. This finding is robust to the inclusion of many firm-level controls, including firm fixed effects, and to the choice of the measure of price informativeness. Consistent with the hypothesis that price informativeness and board monitoring are substitutes, this relation is particularly strong for firms more exposed to both external and internal governance mechanisms and for firms in which firm-specific knowledge is relatively unimportant. Our results suggest that firms, with more informative stock prices have less demanding board structures. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.