Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morck, Randall; Yavuz, M. Deniz; Yeung, Bernard
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Alberta; National University of Singapore; Washington University (WUSTL); Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.12.004
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 264-283
• 关键词: Banking; Ownership structure; capital allocation; Economic growth; family business

摘要

We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. These findings are consistent with theories that elite-capture of a country's financial system can embed crony capitalism. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.