Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hazarika, Sonali; Karpoff, Jonathan M.; Nahata, Rajarishi
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.011
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 44-69
• 关键词: Management turnover; earnings management; corporate governance

摘要

The likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are positively related to a firm's earnings management. These patterns persist in tests that consider the effects of earnings restatements, regulatory enforcement actions, and the possible endogeneity of CEO turnover and earnings management. The relation between earnings management and forced turnover occurs both in firms with good and bad performance, and when the accruals work to inflate or deflate reported earnings. These results indicate that boards tend to act proactively to discipline managers who manage earnings aggressively, before the manipulations lead to costly external consequences. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.