Friends with money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelberg, Joseph; Gao, Pengjie; Parsons, Christopher A.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.003
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 169-188
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; Bank lending; Cost of debt; social connections; Lending outcomes

摘要

When banks and firms are connected through interpersonal linkages - such as their respective management having attended college or previously worked together interest rates are markedly reduced, comparable with single shifts in credit ratings. These rate concessions do not appear to reflect sweetheart deals. Subsequent firm performance, such as future credit ratings or stock returns, improves following a connected deal, suggesting that social networks lead to either better information flow or better monitoring. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.