Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bae, Kee-Hong; Baek, Jae-Seung; Kang, Jun-Koo; Liu, Wei-Lin
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; York University - Canada; Hankuk University Foreign Studies
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.02.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 412-435
• 关键词: Expropriation; corporate governance; Firm value; Asian financial crisis; Controlling shareholder; Cash flow rights; Control rights

摘要

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.