Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lin, Chen; Ma, Yue; Malatesta, Paul; Xuan, Yuhai
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Lingnan University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1-22
• 关键词: ownership structure; Excess control rights; syndicated loans

摘要

Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.