A darker side to decentralized banks: Market power and credit rationing in SME lending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Canales, Rodrigo; Nanda, Ramana
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 353-366
• 关键词: Banking; Bank structure; Soft information; Small business lending

摘要

We use loan-level data to study how the organizational structure of banks impacts small business lending. We find that decentralized banks-where branch managers have greater autonomy over lending decisions-give larger loans to small firms and those with soft information. However, decentralized banks are also more responsive to their own competitive environment. They are more likely to expand credit when faced with competition but also cherry pick customers and restrict credit when they have market power. This darker side to decentralized banks in concentrated markets highlights that the level of local banking competition is key to determining which organizational structure provides better lending terms for small businesses. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.