Fund Manager Allocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fang, Jieyan; Kempf, Alexander; Trapp, Monika
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Cologne; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.11.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 661-674
• 关键词: Manager allocation; performance; skill; market efficiency

摘要

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.