Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adelino, Manuel; Dinc, I. Serdar
• 署名单位: Duke University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.07.004
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 256-272
• 关键词: Distress; lobbying; stimulus; Financial crisis; political economy

摘要

The literature on distressed firms has focused on these firms' investment, capital structure, and labor decisions. This paper investigates a novel aspect of firm behavior in distress: how financial health affects a firm's lobbying and, consequently, its relationship with the government. We exploit the shock to nonfinancial firms during the 2008 financial crisis and the availability of the stimulus package in the first quarter of 2009. We find that firms with weaker financial health, as measured by credit default swap spreads, lobbied more. We also show that the amount spent on lobbying was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving stimulus funds. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.