CEO optimism and incentive compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Otto, Clemens A.
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 366-404
• 关键词: CEO optimism; Incentive compensation; Compensation contract

摘要

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.