Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Chang, Xin; Fu, Kangkang; Low, Angie; Zhang, Wenrui
署名单位:
Nanyang Technological University; INSEAD Business School; Chinese University of Hong Kong
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0304-405X
DOI:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002
发表日期:
2015
页码:
168-188
关键词:
Employee stock options
Corporate innovation
Risk-taking incentives
Employee compensation
摘要:
We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important for innovation, when free-riding among employees is weaker, when options are granted broadly to most employees, when the average expiration period of options is longer, and when employee stock ownership is lower. Further analysis reveals that employee stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.