Attentive insider trading

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alldredge, Dallin M.; Cicero, David C.
• 署名单位: University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 84-101
• 关键词: Insider trading; investor attention; supply chain

摘要

We provide evidence that some profitable insider stock selling is motivated by public information. At firms that disclose having concentrated sales relationships, insiders appear to sell their own stock profitably based on public information about their principal customers. Supplier insiders also sell more stock when public information about their customers' recent returns and earnings surprises suggests they will earn larger profits. These results are stronger when outside investor attention could be lower. Outside of this setting, insiders engage in a higher proportion of routine sales and their sales are less profitable. We do not find similar patterns for insider purchases. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.