Fund managers under pressure: Rationale and determinants of secondary buyouts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arcot, Sridhar; Fluck, Zsuzsanna; Gaspar, Jose-Miguel; Hege, Ulrich
• 署名单位: ESSEC Business School; Michigan State University; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.08.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 102-135
• 关键词: LEVERAGED BUYOUTS; Secondary buyouts; PRIVATE EQUITY; Limited investment horizon; Agency conflicts in fund management

摘要

The fastest growing segment of private equity (PE) deals is secondary buyouts (SBOs)-sales from one PE fund to another. Using a comprehensive sample of leveraged buyouts, we investigate whether SBOs are value-maximizing, or reflect opportunistic behavior. To proxy for adverse incentives, we develop buy and sell pressure indexes based on how close PE funds are to the end of their investment period or lifetime, their unused capital, reputation, deal activity, and fundraising frequency. We report that funds under pressure engage more in SBOs. Pressured buyers pay higher multiples, use less leverage, and syndicate less suggesting that their motive is to spend equity. Pressured sellers exit at lower multiples and have shorter holding periods. When pressured counterparties meet, deal multiples depend on differential bargaining power. Moreover, funds that invested under pressure underperform. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.