How do acquirers choose between mergers and tender offers?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Offenberg, David; Pirinsky, Christo
• 署名单位: Loyola Marymount University; Cornerstone Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.02.006
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 331-348
• 关键词: TENDER OFFERS; Takeover premiums; Mergers and Acquisitions; Termination fees; Arbitrage spreads

摘要

Tender offers provide the advantage of substantially faster completion times than mergers. However, a tender offer signals to the target higher demand for its shares and raises its reservation price. In equilibrium, bidders tradeoff speed and cost. Consistent with this theory, we show that deals in more competitive environments and deals with fewer external impediments on execution are more likely to be structured as tender offers. Tender offers also require higher premiums than mergers. Finally, the rivals of the bidding firm realize significantly lower announcement returns and subsequent operating performance in tender offers than in mergers. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.