Deposits and bank capital structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allen, Franklin; Carletti, Elena; Marquez, Robert
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; University of Pennsylvania; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 601-619
• 关键词: Deposit finance; Bankruptcy costs; regulation

摘要

In a model with bankruptcy costs and segmented deposit and equity markets, we endogenize the cost of equity and deposit finance for banks. Despite risk neutrality, equity capital earns a higher expected return than direct investment in risky assets. Banks hold positive capital to reduce bankruptcy costs, but there is a role for capital regulation when deposits are insured. Banks could no longer use capital when they lend to firms instead of investing directly in risky assets. This depends on whether the firms are public and compete with banks for equity capital or are private with exogenous amounts of capital. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.