Maturity rationing and collective short-termism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Milbradt, Konstantin; Oehmke, Martin
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.08.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 553-570
• 关键词: Short-termism; Asset maturity; Credit rationing; asymmetric information; Cross-firm externality

摘要

Financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined. This interdependence, which links firms' asset and liability sides, can lead to short-termism in investment. In our model, financing frictions increase with the investment horizon, such that financing for long-term projects is relatively expensive and potentially rationed. In response, firms whose first-best investments are long-term may adopt second-best projects of shorter maturities. This worsens financing terms for firms with shorter-maturity projects, inducing them to change their investments as well. In equilibrium, investment is inefficiently short-term. Equilibrium asset-side adjustments by firms can amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be socially undesirable. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.