Corporate governance governance and risk management at unprotected banks: National banks in the 1890s

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calomiris, Charles W.; Carlson, Mark
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.025
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 512-532
• 关键词: Manager ownership; corporate governance; rent seeking; risk preferences; bank failures

摘要

We examine bank governance and risk choices from the 1890s, a period without distortions from deposit insurance or other government assistance to banks. We link differences in managerial ownership to different corporate governance policies, risk, and methods of risk management. Formal corporate governance and high manager ownership are negatively correlated. Managerial salaries and self-lending are greater when managerial ownership is higher and lower when formal governance is employed. Banks with high managerial ownership (low formal governance) target lower default risk. High managerial ownership, not formal governance, is associated with greater reliance on cash instead of equity to limit risk. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.