The effects of takeover defenses: Evidence from closed-end funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Souther, Matthew E.
• 署名单位: University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 420-440
• 关键词: Takeover defenses; Executive compensation; discounts; Closed-end funds

摘要

I use a sample of closed-end funds to examine how takeover defenses impact shareholder value and promote managerial entrenchment. These funds use the same defenses as general corporations but provide an ideal, homogeneous environment for testing their effects. Defenses are associated with lower fund market values, weaker reactions to activist 13D filings, and higher compensation levels for both fund managers and directors. This study provides greater clarity on the unresolved impact of takeover defenses on firm value, while showing for the first time that directors, who are responsible for adopting takeover defenses, financially benefit from their use. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.