Redacting proprietary information at the initial public offering

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boone, Audra L.; Floros, Loannis V.; Johnson, Shane A.
• 署名单位: U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC); Iowa State University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.016
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 102-123
• 关键词: IPO; Product markets; Underpricing; PROPRIETARY INFORMATION; information asymmetry; disclosure

摘要

Nearly 40% of IPO firms redact information from their SEC registration filings. These firms exhibit characteristics consistent with the need to shield proprietary information from potential rivals. They experience greater underpricing, but pre-IPO insiders reduce underpricing-related wealth transfers by selling proportionately less of the firm's shares at the IPO, raising more equity financing in later seasoned equity offerings, and selling their own holdings at a relatively slow pace. The information environment of redacting firms reflects proportionately more private information than that of non-redacting firms post-IPO, but this difference abates by the fourth year. Consistent with the view that redacted proprietary information provides competitive advantages, redacting firms exhibit superior financial performance post-IPO. The results illustrate tradeoffs in balancing a firm's needs to protect proprietary information with its capital needs, investor needs for information to price securities, and pre-IPO owner liquidity needs. Published by Elsevier B.V.