Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Correa, Ricardo; Lel, Ugur
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 500-520
• 关键词: Executive compensation; Say on pay laws; regulations; CEO pay slice; Firm valuation

摘要

Using a large sample of firms from 38 countries over the 2001-2012 period, this study finds evidence that, following the adoption of say on pay (SoP) laws, chief executive officer (CEO) pay growth rates decline and the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance improves. These changes are concentrated in firms with high excess pay and shareholder dissent, long CEO tenure, and less independent boards. Further, the portion of top management pay captured by CEOs is lower in the post-SoP period, which is associated with higher firm valuations. Overall, these results suggest that SoP laws are associated with significant changes in CEO pay policies. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.