Golden hellos: Signing bonuses for new top executives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xu, Jin; Yang, Jun
• 署名单位: Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.11.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 175-195
• 关键词: Executive compensation; Signing bonus; Termination risk; Incentive device

摘要

We examine signing bonuses awarded to executives hired for or promoted to named executive officer (NEO) positions at Standard & Poor's 1500 companies during the period 1992-2011. Executive signing bonuses are sizable and increasing in use, and they are labeled by the media as golden hellos. We find that executive signing bonuses are mainly awarded at firms with greater information asymmetry and higher innate risks, especially to younger executives, to mitigate the executives' concerns about termination risk. When termination concerns are strong, signing bonus awards are associated with better performance and retention outcomes. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.