Shareholder nonparticipation in valuable rights offerings: New findings for an old puzzle

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Holderness, Clifford G.; Pontiff, Jeffrey
• 署名单位: Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 252-268
• 关键词: Rights offerings; AGENCY COSTS; Wealth transfers

摘要

Shareholder participation in valuable domestic rights offerings averages only 64%, which is considerably lower than previously asserted. This causes wealth transfers from nonparticipating to participating shareholders that average 7% of the offering. Wealth transfers are larger in nontransferable and bigger offerings. The stock market reacts more negatively to larger wealth transfers. Offerings with lower shareholder participation also fall short in raising publicly stated capital goals. Rights offerings are far more common in countries with institutional practices that limit nonparticipating shareholders' wealth losses. These findings suggest that agency conflicts influence the use of rights offers. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.