Do staggered boards harm shareholders?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amihud, Yakov; Stoyanov, Stoyan
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.04.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 432-439
• 关键词: Staggered board; Classified board; corporate governance; Antitakeover measures; Takeover defense; Airgas

摘要

We examine the Cohen and Wang (2013) conclusion that a staggered board lowers firm value based on the stock price reaction to two 2010 Delaware court rulings in the Air gas, Inc. case. The first ruling weakened the potency of a staggered board and the second restored it. We find that the Cohen and Wang results, for their sample, become insignificant after excluding a few penny stocks, stocks with value below $10 million, or over-the-counter (non-exchange) stocks. The effects of the rulings are also insignificant for an alternative sample. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.