Staggered boards and long-term firm value, revisited

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cremers, K. J. Martijn; Litov, Lubomir P.; Sepe, Simone M.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Arizona; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.08.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 422-444
• 关键词: Staggered board; Firm value; Stakeholder relationships; INNOVATION

摘要

This paper revisits the staggered board debate focusing on the long-term association of firm value with changes in board structure. We find no evidence that staggered board changes are negatively related to firm value. However, we find a positive relation for firms engaged in innovation and where stakeholder relationships matter more. This suggests that staggered boards promote value creation for some firms by committing the firm to undertaking long-term projects and bonding it to the relationship-specific investments of its stakeholders. Our results are robust to matching procedures and an exogenous change in Massachusetts corporate law that mandated staggered boards. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.